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When international organizations were first set up, mostly in the latter third of 
the nineteenth century, little thought was given to how they might relate to each 
other. And little thought needed to be given: the working assumption was that 
each organization (then still typically referred to as ‘union’) would be 
responsible for its own specific tasks, and that those tasks would rarely, if at all, 
need to be harmonized with each other. Each union had its own function, and 
was set up by member states precisely to give effect to that function.2 
This picture is no longer tenable, if it ever was, and the topic of relations between 
international organizations inter se has come to generate its own research 
agenda. One particular manifestation of relations involving several international 
organizations is that certain organizations are allowed to participate in the 
activities of others or under auspices of others, including in practices of treaty-
making. This applies, in general form, to what are sometimes referred to as 
‘regional economic integration organizations’; in actual practice, there is really 
one entity that is generally considered to fit the bill, and that is the European 
Union (EU).  
Treaty-making is not the only relevant arena, nor is it a particularly well-defined 
arena. There is, for instance, much cooperation going on involving international 
organizations under headings as diffuse as standard-setting, or even 
enforcement: this too can generate standards that may not formally amount to 
new treaty provisions, but may nonetheless exercise normative authority over 
international actors. The work of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Somali 
Coast, a loose network of international organizations, states, industry groups and 
others, might be taken as an example. 
                                                        
1 Academy Professor (Martti Ahtisaari Chair), University of Helsinki. 
2 The underlying theory is often referred to as ’functionalism’. For a theoretical 
critique, see Jan Klabbers, ’The EJIL Foreword: The Transformation of 
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This chapter is however largely devoted to a discussion of the legal issues 
provoked by the position of regional economic integration organizations with 
particular reference to the UN system, especially relating to the EU’s 
participation in treaties concluded within the UN system.3 For, the EU’s special 
position raises a number of intriguing and potentially complicated legal issues, 
many of them masking (or sublimating), as so often, highly controversial political 
issues. Such issues manifest themselves both within the UN – as a matter of UN 
law, one might be tempted to say - and within the EU, as a matter of EU law. In 
what follows, I will briefly address the reason(s) why these matters call for new 
techniques of law-making and procedure (section II) and sketch some conceptual 
issues (section III). Section IV will discuss some of the issues this raises within 
the EU – the EU being effectively the only entity to which this applies. Section V 
will shift the focus to the UN and related organizations (such as the FAO), and 
aims to provide a discussion of the sort of questions this provokes and how 
these, generally, receive their answer. Section VI concludes. 
A search of the UN Treaty Series suggests that the EU, in its various incarnations 
(EEC, EC, EU, and including treaties to which also EU member states are parties) 
is a party to close to 1000 treaties (974). That is a respectable number: a bit 
more than Haiti (754), but less than Canada, India or the United States, all of 
whom are parties to more than 1000 treaties.4 Still excluded are treaties to 
which EU offspring are parties, such as those concluded by the European 
Investment Bank or the European Chemicals Agency. Moreover, the number does 
not reflect participation of the EU in practices that are held not to amount to 
formal treaties, nor in treaty practices that have not been registered with the UN. 
 
II. The Logic 
 
                                                        
3 Editorial note: I will steadfastly refer to the EU, also when addressing earlier 
incarnations (EEC, EC), unless the context demands differently. The Treaty on 
European Union shall be abbreviated as TEU, whereas TFEU stands for the more 
detailed (less ‘constitutional’) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
4 See https://treaties.un.org/pages/Home.aspx?clang=_en (visited 4 June 2018). 
It seems that 1000 is the maximum number of hits available when doing a search 
for treaty participants. 
The EU is, thus far, the only generally recognized specimen of ‘regional economic 
integration organization’. There is no single authoritative international definition 
available of the term5, but given that the EU is usually regarded as the only 
example, it is not unlikely that would-be regional economic integration 
organizations should take on some or all of the characteristics of the EU: set up 
by sovereign states, who have conferred sovereign authority and competences 
on common institutions in economic matters to take decisions or enter into 
agreements binding those same sovereign states.6 In other words, one key 
element would seem to be the possibility of binding the member states, and this 
entails that few organizations qualify. It is not excluded, of course, than in the 
future other organizations take on similar characteristics, although with the 
emergence of trade wars and new protectionism in the first half of 2018, it is 
unlikely that this will happen any time soon.  
Hence, while this contribution aims to address generally the position of 
international organizations, including regional economic integration 
organizations, the practical examples will be derived from the role and 
experiences of the EU. In this light, it may be useful briefly to sketch the EU set-
up: the EU experience is bound to be repeated or mimicked if other regional 
economic integration organizations will be created.  
When the EU was originally established, in the 1950s, one of the ambitions 
behind what was at the time the European Economic Community (EEC) was that, 
after a transitional period of some twelve years, by 1970, certain competences 
would exclusively rest upon the EEC. This made instrumental sense: given the 
idea that the EEC should be a common market, it would need a common tariff at 
its external borders; such a common tariff, in turn, implied a common 
commercial policy; and this, in turn, implied that the six member states (as they 
                                                        
5 Nor is it likely that there could be a single authoritative definition, given the 
uncertainty surrounding the concept of international organization generally. See 
Jan Klabbers, ‘Unity, Diversity, Accountability: The Ambivalent Concept of 
International organization’, (2013) 14 Melbourne Journal of International Law, 
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6 These elements are present in the definition contained in a number of 
conventions: see, e.g., the 2000 Palermo Convention on Organized Crime, article 
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were at the time) were expected to pool their resources and grant the EEC 
exclusive competences to engage in trade relations with the outside world. If the 
EEC treaty was explicit on external trade powers, similar reasoning was applied 
to other fields as well, even where the Treaty did not explicitly grant such 
powers to the EEC, at the exclusion of the member states. 
Most famously this occurred in the field of transport, where the Court of Justice 
made clear that the power to legislate internally (i.e., with respect to the six 
member states) necessarily entailed the power also to act externally: in foro 
interno, in foro externo.7 The precise setting in which the agreement at issue was 
concluded was not considered particularly relevant for purposes of internal EU 
consideration: the European Road Transport Agreement had been negotiated 
under the auspices of the UN’s Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), but 
this only affected the Court’s reasoning in that the forum of UNECE triggered 
consideration of the provision of the EEC Treaty authorizing cooperation with 
and within international organizations but ‘only by common action’ of the 
member states.8 
After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the most recent amendment of the 
EU treaties, it is clear that the EU has powers in external policy fields that are 
directly relevant to the United Nations treaty-making, such as trade and 
investment as well as environmental protection; maritime matters as well as 
transport matters; development as well as agriculture. In addition, the EU is 
explicitly empowered to act within a number of international organizations, 
including the UN family, but also covering entities such as the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development and the Council for Europe.9 
It is undisputed that the EU has external powers (and can thus, for instance, 
conclude treaties), but the precise division of powers inevitably reflects power 
struggles along two axes, which may come into play in the framework of 
multilateral treaty-making. 
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8 Ibid., paragraph 76. 
9 See Article 220 TFEU. 
On the one hand, there is the struggle between the Union and its member states: 
the latter may be reluctant to give up what they see as their sovereign 
prerogatives, whereas the Union may be keen to appropriate powers in order to 
do justice to what it holds to be its main raison d’être: ensure European 
integration. 
In addition though, there is a second axis of trouble: the Union’s institutions do 
not always see eye to eye. The Commission is the executive organ and supposed 
to represent the EU’s common interest. This, in turn, may diverge from the 
interest as conceived by the member states (as represented in the Council and 
variations thereon, such as European Council) or the peoples of Europe, 
represented via direct elections in the European Parliament. And then there is 
the Court of Justice which sees itself as representing the law: it is the guardian of 
legality in the EU. It is by no means uncommon for the Council and the 
Commission to have diverging opinions, or for other vectors of disagreement 
among institutions to arise. 
Either way, the precise boundaries between its powers and those of its member 
states remain disputed. The reason for this seems obvious: a power granted to 
the EU is a power abdicated by the member states.10 Put graphically, if the EU 
has an exclusive power to enter into fisheries conservation treaties with third 
states, this entails that France, or Germany, or any other of the (still) 28 member 
states of the EU, is barred from doing so – pre-empted, in Euro-jargon. 
Hence, the scope of exclusive external powers is subject to a continuous struggle 
between the Union and its members: the EU is generally keen on centralization, 
the member states are generally keen on retaining their powers, even while 
realizing that pooling their resources may be more advantageous than going solo 
– acting as a single bloc prevents third parties (Russia, China, Japan, the US) from 
entertaining ‘divide and rule’ tactics. And this pattern is likely to repeat itself in 
                                                        
10 This, at least, is the generally accepted narrative, treating powers as a zero-
sum game. This seems rather too stylized though: it is possible for the EU to 
interfere with member state prerogatives while exercising its own proper 
powers, and vice versa. See further Jan Klabbers, ‘Restraints on the Treaty-
Making Powers of Member States deriving from EU Law’, in Enzo Cannizzaro 
(ed.), The European Union as an Actor in International Relations (The Hague: 
Kluwer, 2002), 151-175. 
other regional economic integration organizations, as our political imagination is 
limited and we usually resort to mimicry when setting up new entities. 
Where powers are supposed to be shared between the EU and its member states 
(as is the case with environmental protection), the site for struggle becomes the 
precise distribution of competences. In case of a shared competence, e.g., the 
question arises which part (EU or member states) is responsible for which 
aspect of a treaty under negotiation. If the treaty aims at creating a 
comprehensive regime, e.g., it may be the case that its putative provisions 
concerning one domain (e.g., on transboundary transportation of hazardous 
wastes) rests with the member states, whereas the provisions on another topic 
(say, conservation of marine resources) rests with the EU. 
But even where it is clear that the EU’s powers are exclusive, political struggle 
has not come to an end. The EU has exclusive powers in trade (including 
investment), fisheries conservation, and possibly anti-trust matters, but how key 
terms are defined determines the precise scope of those exclusive powers. The 
factor time adds another complication: upon the EU assuming exclusive 
competence, the member states can no longer conclude their own bilateral 
agreements with third parties anymore.11 
 
III. Conceptual Matters 
 
Like any other regional economic integration organization (but as noted, the EU 
is thus far the only recognized species of the genus), the EU can play a role in UN 
treaties (broadly conceived) in a variety of ways, and while the legal regimes 
may overlap, nonetheless it may be useful to distinguish various modes of 
participation. 
First, there is full membership of the UN, or related organizations: the ‘UN family’ 
consists of some twenty international organizations that have entered into a 
relationship with the UN. These include several organizations with tasks which 
                                                        
11 In some of the Open Skies cases (concerning bilateral air traffic agreements 
concluded between various member states and the US), the Court of Justice 
rather quickly held that an amended treaty is to be regarded as a novel legal 
creation. See, e.g., case C-466/98, Commission v United Kingdom, 
ECLI:EU:C:2002:624. 
overlap with those of the EU, and one of them has allowed the EU to join: the 
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO). It bears emphasizing that the EU is 
the only international organization currently in existence which is a member of a 
UN-affiliated organization. Membership of the UN itself and quite a few of the 
other specialized agencies is for the time being out of reach for international 
organizations: most specify that they are only open for membership by states12, 
and not even the EU is a state in any recognized meaning of that term.13 Full 
membership entails the full panoply of rights (and obligations), including the 
right to participate in treaty-making under auspices of the organization 
concerned. This raises questions about the division of tasks and rights between 
the EU and its members that are independent members of the same organization. 
With respect to the FAO, the basic principle is that when the EU participates in a 
vote, its member states do not, and if it is the EU participating, its amount of 
votes equals the number of its member states entitled to vote on the same issue. 
The matter is further governed by a ‘declaration of competence’ issued by the EU 
upon joining the FAO, as required under the FAO Constitution.14 
Second, in organizations that reserve their membership to states, international 
organizations may be given observer status. The EU holds observer status with 
the UN (its General Assembly) as well as with most of the ‘specialized agencies’ 
(UN-related international organizations), including the most recent addition, the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM).  
The precise details may differ from organization to organization, but generally, 
observers are allowed to participate in meetings and will be invited to attend 
diplomatic events both formal and informal (including cocktail parties), but may 
                                                        
12 With respect to the UN the International Court of Justice confirmed as much in 
an early opinion, without however paying too much attention to the precise 
contours of the requirement of statehood. See Conditions of Admission of a State 
to Membership in the United Nations (article 4 of the Charter), advisory opinion, 
[1948] ICJ Reports 57. 
13 See Jan Klabbers, ‘Sui Generis? The EU as an International Organization’, in 
Dennis Patterson and Anna Södersten (eds.), A Companion to European Union 
Law and International Law (Chichester: Wiley, 2016), 3-15. 
14 For a brief overview, see Geert De Baere, ‘EU Status in Other International 
Organizations’, in Robert Schütze and Takis Tridimas (eds.), Oxford Principles of 
European Union Law. Volume I: The European Union Legal Order (Oxford 
University Press, 2018), 1234-1281, esp. 1255-1258. See also below. 
not table proposals or vote.15 With respect to the relationship between the UN 
and the EU, as much is laid down in a General Assembly resolution adopted in 
2011, sketching some rights for the EU, but also explicitly stating that the EU 
representatives shall not have the right to vote, to co-sponsor resolutions or 
decisions, or to put forward candidates. The resolution was adopted with 
overwhelming support: 180 states in favour, with two abstentions (Syria and 
Zimbabwe) and some absentees. Nonetheless, Nauru voiced some (justifiable) 
concerns about how this helps to cement a privileged position for entities able to 
wield economic and political influence.16 Be that as it may, often the EU will act 
on behalf of its member states during treaty negotiations, even where the EU 
itself only has observer status, and under EU law, the member states are under 
an obligation to coordinate their positions and represent the EU in other fora. 
This does not always work: sometimes political divisions between EU member 
states are simply too deep. But in order to harmonize positions treaty 
negotiations tend to be accompanied by EU ‘coordination meetings’, where the 
EU’s member states decide what position to adopt and how to approach the 
matter at hand. These typically take place before multilateral negotiations 
commence (sometimes starting many months earlier) and continue in the 
margins of multilateral treaty negotiations: early in the morning and during 
weekends.  
The status of observers is often said to follow from functional needs: they are co-
opted to the extent that they carry sufficient political weight to be instrumental 
in the solution or management of common issues. One curiosity about observer 
status is that in various organizations (including the International Maritime 
Organization and the World Intellectual Property Organization) observer status 
is held not by the EU but rather by one of its organs: the European Commission. 
This is curious because it would seem that the Commission lacks the required 
                                                        
15 The literature is in serious need of updating, with the most authoritative 
studies dating from the late 1970s and early 1980s. See Eric Suy, ‘The Status of 
Observers in International Organizations’, (1978) 160 Recueil des Cours, 75-179; 
Neri Sybesma-Knol, The Status of Observers in the United Nations (Brussels: Free 
University, 1981. 
16 See UN Doc. A/RES/65/276 for the text of the resolution, while the debate is 
reported on at http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/ga11079.doc.htm (visited 20 
January 2018). 
personality to be performing acts under international law and consequently, the 
treaty partner would be the EU rather than its Commission.17 
A third way of participation by international organizations, including the EU, in 
UN settings is to participate in formal or informal groups, organizations, and 
networks set up by the UN. Perhaps the most eye-catching example of recent 
years is the Contact Group on Piracy of the Coast of Somalia, mentioned above. In 
addition, the EU sometimes concludes treaties with the UN or with UN programs 
or agencies: an example is the 2016 agreement with UNCTAD on cross-border 
trade in Central Africa.18 
Fourth, where the EU is already a party to a multilateral treaty, it enjoys a 
relatively privileged position when it comes to the negotiation of further 
instruments or amendments. In particular, other international organizations 
willing and able to join still have a long process to accomplish; they still need to 
fight for a seat at the table, where the EU is already seated. And being already 
seated implies that often the EU has a voice in who else gets to be seated. 
Finally, it may be the case that international organizations participate in treaties 
concluded under auspices of the UN – it seems that this is, again, largely the sole 
preserve of the EU. Typically, the EU participates in environmental agreements 
and maritime agreements, as in these matters it has some generally recognized 
competences, while commodity agreements (which may, but need not be, 
negotiated under auspices of the UN or UNCTAD) would also affect the EU’s 
competences.19 Still, the EU has also joined other regimes set up by the UN or 
UN-related agencies: it is a party, for instance, to the 2000 Palermo Convention 
                                                        
17 See case C-327/91, France v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1994:305. 
18 As reported at 
http://unctad.org/en/pages/newsdetails.aspx?OriginalVersionID=1356 (visited 
20 January 2018). 
19 It has been reported that the ‘EU and its member States’ have taken active part 
in the negotiations leading to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, for instance, and the EU has also become a party to this Convention. 
On the other hand, in the same breath is mentioned the Enforced Disappearances 
convention which, however, is only open to member states of the UN. See 
Hadewych Hazelzet, ‘The EU’s Human Rights Policy in the UN: An Example of 
Effective Multilateralism?, in Jan Wouters et al. (eds.), The United Nations and the 
European Union: An Ever Stronger Partnership (The Hague: TMC Asser Institute, 
2006), 183-194, at 187. 
on Organized Crime and all its protocols, the WHO Framework Convention on 
Tobacco, and even to a human rights convention: the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities.  
The policy rationale is usually that the multilateral treaty concerned touches 
upon some aspect of EU competence: e.g., the WHO 2003 Framework Convention 
on Tobacco addresses, amongst other things, tobacco advertising, and this can 
have a bearing on the EU’s internal market: different advertising rules across the 
EU’s member states would potentially undermine the internal market. Likewise, 
treaties on cooperation in criminal matters, such as the 2003 Corruption 
Convention, will touch upon an EU competence: since the early 1990s the EU has 
the clear ambition of achieving cooperation and integration in the field of justice 
and cooperation in criminal matters. Much the same could be said for human 
rights treaties, but these tend to come with monitoring mechanisms that are 
often deemed incompatible with the role of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union as the ultimate guardian of legality within the EU. This perceived 
incompatibility has thwarted several attempts by the EU to join the European 
Convention on Human Rights20, but formed no obstacle to the EU joining the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, as with respect to this 
convention the monitoring mechanism is provided in a separate protocol (to 
which the EU is not a party). 
Hence, there are several possible forms in which the role of international 
organizations (in reality mostly the EU) within the UN and its family can play out. 
Adding the EU perspective, the picture becomes more complicated still. Partly 
this is because external agreements can relate to each of the three former pillars 
of the EU (economy, foreign policy, home affairs), which are subject to different 
procedures and dynamics, resulting from different sensitivities relating to 
sovereign prerogatives. In foreign policy, e.g., initiatives should emanate from 
the High Representative rather than from the Commission, and the role of the 
                                                        
20 Most recently in Opinion 2/13, ELI:EU:C:2014:2454. 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)over foreign policy issues is 
seriously limited when compared to its general role.21 
 
IV. European Experiences 
 
The main practical issue arising with respect to the EU is often colloquially 
referred to as ‘mixity’, an intriguing technique for managing the co-existence of 
legal powers held by both the EU and its member states. Some have, somewhat 
charitably perhaps, heralded mixity as the EU’s contribution to political theory – 
as its own, uniquely European, version of quasi-federal doctrine; and while 
charitable, there is some truth to this.22 
At the core of mixity is the idea that where competences are shared, both 
‘shareholders’ ought to be involved. Agreements with third parties, in other 
words, ought to have ‘mixed’ participation of both the member states and the EU 
itself. This sounds easy and rather obvious, but it is not: many treaties, for 
instance, are only to open for participation by states, and since the EU is not a 
state, it cannot always participate. 
This came to the fore already in the early 1970s, once the external commerce 
power had been transferred to the EU. It turned out that this demanded 
collective action within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, but GATT 
did not provide for membership by an entity such as the EU. The Court found a 
pragmatic solution in a theory of succession, launched in International Fruit 
Company.23 It held that the EU was the successor to the rights and obligation of 
its member states under GATT, and posited three requirements for such a 
succession theory to apply. First, the member states must have intended to 
transfer powers to the EU; second, they must have actually transferred these 
                                                        
21 See Article 275 TFEU; see Panos Koutrakos, ‘Judicial Review in the EU’s 
Common Foreign and Security Policy’, (2018) 67 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly, 1-35. 
22 See J.H.H. Weiler, ’The External Legal Relations of Non-unitary Actors: Mixity 
and the Federal Principle’, reproduced in J.H.H. Weiler, The Constitution of 
Europe (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 130-187. 
23 See Cases 21-24/72, International Fruit Company v Produktschap voor 
Groenten en Fruit, ECLI:EU:C:1972:115. 
powers; and third, their treaty partners (in this case the other GATT parties) 
must have accepted the transfer.24 
The succession theory is less appropriate in those fields where there can be 
legitimate doubt whether member states have intended to transfer powers or 
have actually transferred powers (and have done so irrevocably). Surely, such an 
argument is much more compelling in the field of commerce than it is in, say, 
security, or even transport.25 Note however that it was accepted, in first instance, 
in a well-known case involving United Nations sanctions, although the 
succession doctrine did not survive the appeals stage of the same case.26 The net 
result is that in some settings, the EU cannot join even if all its member states 
have joined an external regime; in such cases, the member states are under a 
strong duty of cooperation.27 
The more common technique then is mixity, i.e. the joint participation of both the 
EU and its member states.28 The need to do so, as noted, arose when external 
agreements would cover topics that fell in part within the exclusive competence 
of the EU and in part within the exclusive competence of the member states, but 
this rationale has been expanded. Mixed treaties are concluded when 
competences are shared but not strictly delimited, and even when the subject 
matter falls solely within the powers of the EU.29 In the latter case, the 
justification is a practical one: involving all the member states is bound to 
                                                        
24 The Court engaged in a narrative from which these three requirements can be 
deduced. 
25 See, e.g., Case 308/06, Intertanko, ECLI:EU:C:2008:312. 
26 The doctrine was upheld by the EU’s Court of First Instance in Case T-315/01, 
Kadi v Council and Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2005:332, paras. 193-203. On appeal, 
the CJEU effectively ignored the succession doctrine, reaching its conclusions via 
a different route. See Case C-402/05 P, Kadi v Council and Commission, 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:461. 
27 See Opinion 2/91 (ILO), ECLI:EU:C:1993:106. 
28 Seminal is Joni Heliskoski, Mixed Agreements as a Technique for Organizing the 
International Relations of the European Community and it Member States (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2001); see also Christophe Hillion and Panos Koutrakos 
(eds.), Mixed Agreements Revisited: The EU and Its Member States in the World 
(Oxford: Hart, 2010). 
29 Not always though: the EU is a party to some treaties, especially commodity 
agreements, in the exercise of its exclusive powers. Examples include the 2007 
International Coffee Agreement and the 2010 International Cocoa Agreement 
(not in force, but provisionally applied). 
enhance the legitimacy of the external agreement in the eyes of those member 
states, and this will help in faithful implementation.30 
Since the obvious question arises about which part is ultimately responsible for 
implementation of which part of any external agreement, often regional 
economic integration organizations such as the EU are required to issue a 
declaration on the division of competences. The EU tends to be reluctant to be 
overly specific, for the (understandable) reason that a clear declaration on 
division of competences may come to have the effect of freezing that particular 
division: if the EU declares that the power to do X rests with the member states, 
it might pre-empt the possibility of the power to do X being transferred to the EU 
in the near future.31 As a result, such declarations tend to include the caveat that 
the current division of powers should not be seen as final - an example is the 
declaration attached to the instrument of confirmation of the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities which provides that the ‘scope and exercise’ 
of Union competence are ‘by their nature, subject to continuous 
development…’.32 
Technically, mixed agreements give rise to sometimes complicated or awkward 
issues.33 One relatively straightforward issue relates to the question of signature: 
who gets to sign the treaty concerned? Obviously, in case both the EU and its 
member states are involved, all member states are expected to sign, as is the EU. 
The question remains though who is to sign on behalf of the EU. This depends on 
a Council decision, as the Council is authorized, under Article 216 TFEU, to 
decide on the issue. It may do so itself (mostly through the member state 
occupying the Presidency), or delegate it to the Commission or even, 
                                                        
30 The EU may have a bureaucratic apparatus, but it lacks its own customs 
officials, police officers, prison wardens et cetera; hence, for the implementation 
of the agreements to which it is a party, the EU strongly depends on its member 
states, acting, one might say, as organs of the EU. 
31 Obviously, the reverse applies as well, but is generally considered to be less of 
a concern, if only because powers are often considered to be revocable by the 
member states. The classic study is Daniela Obradovic, ‘Repatriation of Powers in 
the European Community’, (1997) 34 Common Market Law Review, 59-88. 
32 https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
15&chapter=4&clang=_en (visited 3 October 2017). 
33 Also during the life of a treaty: think of the making of reservations, the 
authority to interpret, or the facility of proposing amendments. 
hypothetically, to yet another member state. Even so, for internal legality 
purposes, the Council must adopt a decision approving the agreement in 
question – the agreement cannot be considered approved without such a 
decision. As a corollary, when the validity of the agreement is later contested, all 
that can be done internally is that the Council decision approving it is invalidated 
– the EU cannot, on its own, declare an agreement concluded with third parties 
invalid. 
In most cases, there is an additional complication in that the Council can approve 
external agreements only with the consent of the European Parliament, or 
having consulted the European Parliament. Parliament’s consent is required for 
several classes of agreements, including association agreements or other 
agreements setting up an institutional framework, including those negotiated 
under UN auspices. In most other cases it needs to be consulted, with the 
exception of foreign policy agreements.34 
Two additional issues stand out, none of them seemingly spectacular or of great 
legal import but both of them of the utmost practical – and political – relevance. 
The first relates to the negotiating position: with a couple of interested 
institutions (Council, Commission and Parliament) and 28 member states, it is by 
no means self-evident what position the EU shall take, and how it shall try to give 
effect to its position. The TFEU does not offer much guidance beyond suggesting 
that the matter of treaty negotiations is formally in the hands of the Council.35 
And yet, a number of practical issues need to be discussed beforehand, including 
the question what kind of agreement will be negotiated. Typically, the Council 
will work on the basis of a recommendation stemming from the Commission (or, 
if the matter relates mostly to security, from the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy), outlining why the topic is relevant, 
what the Union’s interest is, and how it is best approached from an EU 
perspective. Once this is done, the Council can decide to allow the Commission to 
enter into negotiations, designate the Commission as the main negotiator, and 
present it with the negotiation directives. 
                                                        
34 See Article 218 TFEU. 
35 A separate procedure relates to trade agreements, under Article 207 TFEU. 
All of this breaks down into a number of more detailed questions. To what extent 
is EU competence involved? Is the EU itself even allowed, under the rules of the 
relevant international organization, to participate in the negotiations and if so, 
can it do so as full participant or only as observer? In the latter case, after all, it 
may not be allowed to vote (and thus needs to rely on its member states toeing 
the line), and may not even have a seat at the main negotiating table. More to the 
point, usually with mixed agreements issues within EU competence shall be left 
to the Commission, with the Council Presidency (which rotates among member 
states every six months) representing member state competences – it is thus 
convenient if Commission and Presidency can be seated in close proximity.36 
 
V. On the Receiving End 
 
As a theoretical matter, international organizations can only act within other 
international organizations if and when they are allowed to act: third parties are 
under no obligation to recognize their existence, and are under no obligation to 
facilitate internal processes within some organization or other by collaborating 
in its external relations. It follows that, if and when treaties are only open for 
participation by states, organizations have no role to play unless the putative 
treaty partners allow this. This starting point seems to be generally accepted: it 
already underpinned the ‘succession theory’ launched by the CJEU in 
International Fruit Company. 
In this light, it is perhaps surprising how willing third parties, both within and 
without the UN, have been to accommodate the EU, even though functionally 
much of this makes sense. Clearly, since the EU exercises powers on a number of 
issues (sometimes excluding member state powers), there is a functional reason 
to facilitate cooperation with it.  
In some cases, cooperation warrants amendment of constituent documents. The 
FAO, as is well-known, changed its Constitution in order to allow the EU to join it. 
                                                        
36 Much of this is culled from Hillion and Koutrakos (eds.), Mixed Agreements 
Revisited; see also Pieter Jan Kuijper et al. (eds.), The Law of EU External 
Relations: Cases, Materials, and Commentary on the EU as an International Legal 
Actor (Oxford University Press, 2013), esp. 69-75. 
Originally only open to ‘nations’37, and allowing international organizations on 
the basis of an observer-type status but without the right to vote38, in the early 
1990s the FAO constitution was amended so as to facilitate membership of 
regional economic integration organizations, meaning the EU. Several conditions 
must be met though: such an organization must be composed of states; a 
majority of its member states must also be members of the FAO, and it must have 
competence over matters within the purview of the FAO.39 
This does not exhaust the matter, as the joint membership of both the EU and its 
member states raises a number of practical issues, ranging from speaking and 
voting rights and membership of subsidiary organs to such things as budgetary 
assessments. As mentioned, within the FAO, careful delimitations have been put 
in place. Article II FAO specifies, in paragraphs 5-7, that regional economic 
integration organizations need to submitted declarations of competence of the 
sort discussed above; that they shall announce changes in the division of 
competences, and that the default presumption is that competences are 
presumed to have been retained by member states unless otherwise notified or 
informed. 
Membership rights, so paragraph 8 of Article II continues, shall be exercised on 
an ‘alternative basis’ between the EU and its member states in their respective 
spheres of competence, and the EU can participate in meetings and organs of the 
FAO within its competences, except in organs of limited membership. Voting too 
relates to the division of competences: where the EU is competent, it can vote but 
then its member states cannot – and vice versa.40 For the time being, the FAO is 
the only organization in the UN family of which the EU is a member, indeed, to 
which any international organization is a member.41 Organizations play a role in 
                                                        
37 Article II, paragraph 2 FAO. This is rare, and potentially risky, in that states and 
nations need not (indeed, often are not) identical. Some treaties are only open to 
‘governments’, which is also rare and perhaps a tad inaccurate, as governments 
tend to represent states. An example is the 1946 International Whaling 
Convention. 
38 Article II, paragraph 5 FAO (old). 
39 Article II, paragraph 4 FAO (as amended). 
40 Article II(10) FAO. 
41 The EU is a founding member of the World Trade Organization, but the WTO is 
not considered a member of the UN family. 
other UN-related organizations, whether as observer or otherwise, but falling 
short of membership. 
Other conventions have imagined different mechanisms to accommodate 
regional economic integration organizations.  Such organizations are, for 
instance, allowed to become a party to the 1992 UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, but if they do and none of their member states also join, then 
they shall be bound by all the obligations under the Convention.42 In other 
words, any possibly internally existing division of competences shall be ignored. 
This is, however, a highly unlikely scenario; the more likely scenario is that of 
joint or mixed membership, in which case the regional economic integration 
organization concerned shall issue a declaration on the division of competences, 
as discussed above with respect to the EU. 
Even when not formal members, international organizations may and do 
exercise influence on treaty-making processes43, and for good reason. After all, 
often enough international organizations possess a broad knowledge base, 
typically the sort of expertise that may be of assistance when negotiating a 
multilateral treaty on a particular topic associated with the common good, and it 
is typically on such topics that agreements are concluded under UN auspices. An 
example, still ongoing, relates to the conclusion of a convention on marine 
biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction. Here, an informal working 
group laying much of the groundwork included ‘permanent observers’ such as 
the EU, the Caribbean Community, the Asian-African Legal Consultative 
Organization, and Pacific Islands Forum44, as well as a number of specialized 
agencies (FAO, WIPO, International Seabed Authority, and UNESCO) and other 
organizations with an ad hoc participant status, such as various regional 
fisheries commissions. Given the substance matter of the agreement under 
                                                        
42 See article 22 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
43 The EU proudly boasts that a 2017 IMO agreement to improve safety of 
passenger ships owes much to the work of the EU and its European Maritime 
Safety Agency: see 
https://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/maritime/news/2017-06-16-maritime-
transport-commission-welcomes-international-agreement_en (visited 20 
January 2018). 
44 Also mentioned is the International Union for the Conservation of Nature, but 
it is unclear whether this qualifies as an intergovernmental organization. 
preparation (a convention addressing biodiversity in maritime areas beyond 
national jurisdiction, dealing with conservation but also with possible industrial 
applications of  natural resources and the intellectual property implications 
thereof), all of these can be considered stakeholders in a relevant sense, boasting 
specific expertise or having a specific interest.45   
While the precise prerogatives of such participating organizations may differ in 
different contexts, having a seat at the table well-nigh guarantees possibilities for 
exercising at least a modest degree of influence, both by means of taking the 
floor and (possibly of greater practical relevance) by lobbying the national 
delegations, bringing matters to their attention, and generally bringing their 
expertise to bear on the matter.  
 
VI. To Conclude 
 
The position of international organizations within other organizations has thus 
far rarely been studied46, and practical examples are few and far between. Much 
the same applies to practices of treaty participation: it is generally acknowledged 
that the EU participates in treaties47, but with respect to other organizations, far 
less is known. It is sobering to realize perhaps that the leading study on the UN’s 
treaty practice dates back to the 1950s48, and that there is no comprehensive 
study available of the legal aspects of treaty-making within the UN. The General 
                                                        
45 The composition can be found at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/biodiversityworkinggroup/documents/participa
nts_wg9.pdf (visited 20 January 2018). Most of these are also participating in the 
work of the Preparatory Commission advising the General Assembly on elements 
of a convention: see 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/biodiversity/prepcom_files/Final_List_of_Particip
ants_BBNJ_IV_Jan_2018.pdf (visited 20 January 2018). 
46 A pioneering monograph, now largely outdated, is Rachel Frid, The Relations 
between the EC and International Organizations: Legal Theory and Practice (The 
Hague: Kluwer, 1995). 
47 For an overview, see Delano Verwey, The European Community, the European 
Union and the International Law of Treaties (The Hague: TMC Asser Instituut, 
2004). 
48 See Shabtai Rosenne, ‘United Nations Treaty Practice’, (1954) 86 Recueil des 
Cours, 275-444. 
Assembly reviewed the multilateral treaty-making process, but did so as long 
ago as the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
The treaty practice of the EU, in all its diverse aspects, has inspired a number in-
depth studies over the years. By contrast, its membership of international 
organizations has been less popular as a research topic, and relations between 
international organizations generally inter se is only starting to be recognized as 
a proper topic for further study and reflection, and much the same applies to the 
position of the EU in UN-sponsored treaty negotiations. These are topics of great 
practical and political significance, not least with a view to the lessons any future 
regional economic integration may learn. They are also, however, of great 
theoretical relevance: the more organizations interact with each other, the more 
they must be seen as autonomously operating entities. And this, in turn, suggests 
they can no longer accurately be portrayed as merely exercising powers 
delegated by their member states. Any novel way of thinking about international 
organizations must probably reserve some role for delegation (this, after all, is 
how organizations come into being), but should not hesitate to look beyond 
delegation as well. This is a lesson the EU teaches us in its own right, and a lesson 
taught even more strongly when considering the relationship between the EU 
and the UN and the EU’s role in UN treaty-making processes. 
 
